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Wilful Blindness or Blissful Ignorance?                                                                                                                 
The United States and the Successful Denuclearisation of Iraq 
 
The destruction of Iraq’s nuclear capability by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
in 1992 is a remarkable example of successful nuclear counter-proliferation by the international 
community. Yet, in many respects, this was achieved in spite of the US Intelligence Community 
(IC)—and, indeed the US government as a whole—rather than because of it. Although the 
outcome of the inspections of Iraq’s nuclear facilities was the desired one, the US intelligence 
agencies, principally the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), consistently either failed to see or 
refused to see that Saddam Hussein’s nuclear programme had been dismantled. From the Clinton 
years to the Bush administration, the CIA offered a worst case scenario analysis that focused on 
the small amount that was not known about Iraq’s nuclear programme at the expense of the 
larger picture of successful dismantling. How could this great success—recognised at the time by 
the United Nations’ nuclear inspectors—be completely missed by the US intelligence?  
This question has been the focus of numerous official and academic enquiries since 2004. The 
2005 Presidential Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (also known as the Robb-Silberman Commission) laid the blame 
firmly on the CIA for failing to explain to policy makers that intelligence was inherently 
uncertain and inexact; however, there was no examination of the political use of intelligence by 
policy makers. Similarly the July 2004 report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
focused only on the CIA and not on policy makers’ use of intelligence.1 Unofficial, and actually 
                                                
1 The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
March 31, 2005, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/pdf/full_wmd_report.pdf .Report of the Senate Committee on 
Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (henceforth SSCI 2004), 
July 9, 2004,  http://intelligence.senate.gov/108301.pdf This first instalment of the Senate investigation examines 
more penetrating, accounts have rightly scrutinized the Bush administration’s manipulation of 
intelligence on Iraq’s nuclear and other WMD programmes and point out that, in the words of 
the Downing Street memo, “the intelligence and facts were…fixed around the policy.”2  This 
chapter seeks to enhance that analysis by taking a longer view and suggesting that US 
intelligence on Iraq had been hyper-politicized since the end of the 1991 Gulf War and 
throughout the Clinton years. To be sure, officials in the Bush administration were determined to 
find intelligence that might support their decision to go to war, but they were only accentuating 
trends that went back to the early 1990s when Iraq was first designated a “rogue state.”  The 
failure to witness the successful denuclearization of Iraq throughout the 1990s and into the 
twenty-first century was the result of an atmosphere in which intelligence and policy making 
toward Iraq had been hyper-politicised for a decade; where successive administrations had set 
Saddam up as one of America’s most formidable adversaries to fill the “threat blank” that 
followed the end of the Cold War; and where this unchallenged assumption left US intelligence 
unable and/or unwilling to grasp the reality that the inspections by the IAEA’s Iraq Nuclear 
Verification Office (INVO) had succeeded.3 In essence, the hypothesis presented here is that 
                                                                                                                                                       
failures on the part of the Intelligence Community. The second part of the report (‘Phase II’) was due to examine the 
political use of intelligence by policy makers. This was postponed until after the 2004 Presidential election and then 
delayed by Republicans on the Senate Intelligence Committee who sought to downplay the potential political impact 
of such a report. After some obstructionism by Republicans on the committee, it was not until 2008, with much less 
media attention, that the Phase II report on the political use of intelligence was released. See Senate Committee on 
Intelligence, Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials were Substantiated 
by Intelligence Information, June 2008, http://intelligence.senate.gov/080605/phase2a.pdf  (all accessed 12 January 
2011)     
2 ‘The secret Downing Street memo’, The Sunday Times, 1 May 2005, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article387374.ece  (14 December 2010). For background, see John 
Diamond, The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of 
Iraq (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2008): chapter 9. John Prados, Hoodwinked: The Documents 
That Reveal How Bush  Sold Us a War (The New Press, New York 2006). Paul Pillar ‘Intelligence, Policy and the 
War in Iraq’ Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006: 15-27. James Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11 and the Abuse of 
America's Intelligence Agencies (Doubleday Books, New York 2004).  
3 Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia identified the co-called “threat blank” in March 1990. See David Armstrong, ‘Dick 
Cheney’s Song of America’ Harpers Magazine, October 2002: 77  
post-1991 US policy towards Iraq—rather than just post-9/11 policy—was overwhelmingly 
driven by politics rather than intelligence. While all intelligence remains imperfect and 
subjective, and rarely reveals a full and complete picture, the hypothesis of this chapter is that the 
identification of Iraq as the key ‘rogue state’, the political commitment to regime change in 
Baghdad from the mid-nineties onwards, and the long-standing context of regional energy 
security, led to an atmosphere of hyper-politicisation in Washington, where the only view that 
was ever considered was that Saddam Hussein retained not just the desire to use weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) but that he actually possessed some of those weapons or the means to 
manufacture them. This chapter will examine the damaging effects that this hyper-politicisation 
had on US intelligence and policy making and on the international efforts to disarm Saddam. 
In making this argument, two caveats seem necessary. The first, as implied above, is that I do not 
seek to argue that politicization can be erased completely or that the CIA and others should have 
pieced together the available information in such a way as to clearly reveal every facet of 
Baghdad’s strategy and outlook. Such an outcome is rarely achievable in the world of 
intelligence. What concerns me is that, in the evidence currently available, the possibility of 
success was never considered despite the serious weight of evidence from the inspections 
regime—INVO in particular—suggesting that the analyses of the US IC were superficial in 
many ways. There appears to have been no attempt to challenge existing assumptions despite 
signs that should have prompted a degree of reassessment. 
A second caveat, related to this, is the issue of what sources are currently available to those 
seeking to understand why the CIA made the judgements that it did during the 1990s and early 
2000s. Inevitably, any judgements made here are based on an incomplete documentary record 
and may be disproved as more material is released. It seems unlikely that the unclassified CIA 
reports to Congress that I quote later in this chapter are not representative of the classified 
versions of those reports; material is usually withheld to avoid compromising sources rather than 
because classified reports make significantly different overall judgements to their unclassified 
counterparts. Nevertheless, there is a vast amount of material currently unavailable. This chapter 
seeks to pose questions that intelligence historians should, in my view, return to in future and to 
present a hypothesis that opens up future avenues for discussion as more materials are 
declassified. That said, there is some useful material available already, which permits us to begin 
the analysis and draw tentative conclusions.  
 As Graham Pearson has noted, there has been a reluctance in some of the ongoing international 
arms control negotiations to draw on the Iraq experience.4 This is particularly the case for the 
nuclear issue: references to INVO in memoirs by former inspectors and in popular and academic 
accounts are few and far between.5 Its work has been obscured by the general focus on the 
travails of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which searched for chemical 
and biological weapons (CBW) and had to deal with concealment and deception efforts by the 
Iraqis. Yet despite the controversy that the inspections process generated, it was remarkably 
successful; INVO dismantled Saddam’s nuclear capability, while UNSCOM removed his 
                                                
4 Graham S. Pearson, The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Inspection, Verification and Non-
Proliferation (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2005):70 
5  See for instance Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq (Public Affairs, New York 2009). 
Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security (Public 
Affairs, New York 2000). Scott Ritter, Endgame: Solving the Iraq Crisis (Simon & Schuster, New York 1999). 
Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction (Bloomsbury, London 2004). Given 
Blix’s position as head of INVO, his book contains more information on INVO than the other accounts, although it 
is not exclusively about the nuclear inspections. Pearson’s Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction deals 
only with UNSCOM and CBW. The following contain some discussion of UNSCOM but virtually none on INVO: 
Dilip Hiro, Iraq: A Report from the Inside (Granta Books, London 2003); James Risen State of War: The Secret 
History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (Free Press, New York 2006); Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers, The 
Political Road the War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam (Routledge, Oxon and New York 
2007). Neither UNSCOM nor INVO are mentioned at all in Robert Jervis’ Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the 
Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 2010).  
chemical and biological weapons and infrastructure.6 There is much for US intelligence to learn 
from this, both in terms of its analysis of potential threats and what kind of a role it should—or 
should not—play in the practical task of disarmament. More often than not, however, 
intelligence only informs policy when it supports the pre-existing preferences of policy makers. 
The United States’ pursuit of regime change in Iraq from the mid-nineties onwards meant that 
the Clinton and Bush administrations either would not or could not accept the nullification of 
Baghdad’s nuclear programme thus continuing the cycle of policy-driven intelligence, which 
culminated in regime change in 2003.7 Without a doubt, Saddam’s erratic co-operation with the 
UNSCOM inspectors nourished suspicions that he retained chemical and/or biological weapons; 
nevertheless, as Hans Blix, former director of INVO, points out, there were also other reasons, 
unrelated to maintaining WMD, why Saddam might have sometimes denied access to UNSCOM 
inspectors; we shall come to these later.8 In the end, it was not until well after the 2003 invasion 
when the final team of inspectors failed to uncover any banned weapons programmes that the 
belated recognition of the success of INVO (and UNSCOM) came. This chapter will argue that 
while improvements in intelligence analysis are always salutary, we should be wary of assuming 
that better intelligence will result in more effective non-proliferation efforts. As the deliberate 
inequities of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty affirm, nuclear policy is always subject to a 
political power calculus that transcends intelligence.   
                                                
6 For a summary of the achievements of both INVO and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), 
which inspected chemical and biological sites, see the Report of the First Panel Established Pursuant to the Note By 
the President of the Security Council on 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100), Concerning Disarmament and Current and 
Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Issues (henceforth the Amorim Report), 27 March 1999, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/Amorim%20Report.htm  (13 May 2010).  
7 Charles Duelfer makes the point that the Clinton administration did not want Iraq to be found in compliance with 
the UN resolutions on disarmament. See Hide and Seek: 164 
8  See Blix, Disarming Iraq: 26, 36, 265-6. 
“Rogue States”, the Middle East and the Post-Soviet “Threat Blank”                                                                   
The origins of the political elevation of the Iraqi threat lie in the end of the Cold War. In March 
1990, Senator Sam Nunn, a Democrat from Georgia and Chair of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, told fellow senators that there was a “threat blank” in the Bush administration’s 
proposed $295 billion defence budget and that the Pentagon’s “basic assessment of the overall 
threat to our national security” was “rooted in the past.” There had been tumultuous changes in 
the world since 1989 but “the development of a new military strategy that respond[ed] to these 
changes in the threat ha[d] not yet occurred.”9 Threatened with cuts in defence expenditure, the 
military and the Bush administration knew that it would have to fill the “threat blank” so as to 
avoid having cuts foisted upon it by Congress. Although some reductions would be inevitable, 
the cuts could be minimised if the military itself could shape the process by presenting Congress 
with a new post-Cold War global strategic blueprint to guide future planning and 
appropriations.10 This would mean finding new, post-Soviet justifications for the Pentagon’s 
substantial budget and a search for new strategic adversaries. As Colin Powell, Chair of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), quipped in 1991, “I’m running out of villains. I’m down to Castro and Kim 
Il Sung.”11 
Powell had recognised as early as 1987 that changes in posture and force structure would soon be 
necessary and when he became Chair of the JCS in 1989, he accelerated planning for post-Cold 
                                                
9 Cited in Armstrong, ‘Dick Cheney’s Song of America’: 77 
10 Colin Powell, A Soldier’s Way: An Autobiography (Arrow Books, London 1995): 451. 
11 Powell quoted in Karl Kaysen, Robert S. McNamara and George W. Rathjens, ‘Nuclear Weapons After the Cold 
War’ Foreign Affairs, Fall 1991: 96. On the search for new strategic adversaries, see Lorna S. Jaffe, The 
Development of the Base Force 1989-1992, (Joint History Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 
1993): 9-11. Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America’s Search for a New Foreign Policy (Hill 
and Wang, New York, 1995): 12-16. Eric V. Larson, David T. Orletsky and Kristin J. Leuschner. Defense Planning 
in a Decade of Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review and Quadrennial Defense Review 
(RAND, Santa Monica, Arlington, Pittsburgh 2001) : 8.  
War strategic scenarios, which would permit the retention of a military establishment still large 
enough to ensure Washington’s status as a global superpower. He eventually settled on the so-
called ‘Base Force’, which signified the level below which US forces could not go if the country 
was to maintain its position as the global superpower. The Base Force would be able to fight and 
win two simultaneous major regional conflicts resembling Desert Storm.12 The culmination of 
Powell’s thinking was the National Military Strategy of January 1992, which envisioned a 
strategic posture founded upon a framework of regional contingencies. “We will, of course, deter 
and defend against strategic nuclear attacks… (and) retain the potential to defeat a global threat” 
the strategy stated; “[h]owever, our plans and resources are primarily focused on deterring and 
fighting regional rather than global wars.”13 Such contingencies would most likely take the form 
of developing states armed with WMD threatening regional stability and US interests. Saddam 
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 seemed to confirm this premise and Iraq became 
the exemplar of the regional aggressor.14  
However, Iraq was an anomalous case. The regional contingencies framework, which was 
based on fighting two Iraq-type conflicts simultaneously vastly overstated the potential of post-
Desert Storm regional aggressors to challenge the United States. Even Powell himself 
                                                
12 See National Military Strategy of the United States (henceforth NMS 1992), 1 January 1992, 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA338837&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf  (21 May 2010): 17-
18.  Colin L. Powell, ‘U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead’ Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992-93: 41-44.  Jaffe, Development 
of the Base Force: 21-22. Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: 28-34.  
13 NMS 1992: 11 
14 In his speech at the Aspen Institute, less than 24 hours after the invasion, Bush stated that “the brutal aggression 
launched last night against Kuwait illustrates my central thesis.” See Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium in 
Aspen, Colorado, 2 August 1990, Public Papers of George Bush, George Bush President Library and Museum,  
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2128&year=1990&month=8  (21 May 2010). The 1992 
National Military Strategy also pointed to North Korea “and perhaps even a hostile Iran” as potential regional 
threats. See 1992 National Military Strategy: 3. 
commented in April 1991 that he would be “very surprised if another Iraq occurred.” 15 As 
Michael Klare, David Callahan and Lawrence J. Korb have demonstrated, far from being 
representative of potential regional aggressors, the Iraq of 1990 was an anomalous case, an 
exceptional rather than a typical military threat.16 Baghdad had been stronger militarily than all 
other potential regional aggressors (such as Iran, Syria, Libya and North Korea) and was 
unique in its proximity to US vital interests. The only two potential aggressors that came close 
to Iraqi strength in 1990 were Syria and North Korea but both were balanced by powerful pro-
American neighbours meaning that external territorial aggression was unlikely.17 Iran’s 1991 
defence budget of $3.2B was a long way behind the $8.6B Iraq spent in 1990. Yet despite 
Iraq’s strength it was defeated with ease by coalition forces—but Powell’s Base Force, 
formally unveiled in 1992 after the military destruction of Iraq, was designed not just to fight 
one aggressor resembling pre-Desert Storm Iraq, but two simultaneously; a prospect that even 
Powell had acknowledged was remote indeed. However, this inflated calculation of the 
strength of regional aggressors—and the plan to fight two of them simultaneously—was 
necessary to help justify relatively high US force levels in the post-Cold War world. Powell 
had called the new military structure the ‘Base Force’ to indicate that this was a level below 
which US forces could not fall if the United States was to maintain its position as the world’s 
sole superpower. Thus the prototype of the pre-Desert Storm Iraq helped to rationalise US 
                                                
15 Cited in David Callahan, ‘Saving Defense Dollars’, Foreign Policy, No. 96 (Autumn 1994): 102 
16 Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: 130-69. Callahan, ‘Saving Defense Dollars’: 94-112.  Lawrence J. 
Korb, ‘Our Overstuffed Armed Forces’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 1995: 22-34 
17 North Korea came closest to Iraq’s position in 1990 but had only had only half the population of its southern 
neighbour and one sixteenth of its GDP; not to mention the serious questions about the combat readiness of North 
Korea’s military. Callahan, ‘Saving Defense Dollars’: 102-3. On the combat readiness (or lack of it) of the North 
Korean army see John Feffer, North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis (Seven Stories Press, New 
York, 2003): 66-70. 
force levels in the post-Soviet world where there was now no other obvious major adversary to 
justify the largest military establishment in the world.  
The Clinton administration fully accepted the regional contingency framework in its own 
Bottom-Up Review of the military in 1993.18 In 1994, Clinton’s National Security Advisor, 
Anthony Lake, published an article in Foreign Affairs in which he identified Iraq, Iran, North 
Korea, Cuba and Libya as “backlash states” because of their “aggressive and defiant” 
behaviour.19 Iraq and Iran were the two most immediate problems because of their proximity to 
critical American interests, Lake stated, and he outlined a policy of “dual containment” of 
Baghdad and Tehran.20 Increasingly, the “backlash states” became known as the “rogue states” 
in the administration’s public discourse and the leading rogue state was Iraq.21 As General 
Wesley Clark comments, “the threat from Iraq came to assume a major role in U.S. defense 
planning” and “scenarios from hypothetical war in Iraq were used in requirements studies for 
weapons procurements, force designs and training.”22  
The political utility of the rogue state narrative was not the only reason US policy towards Iraq 
became so politicized. No analysis of US policy towards Iraq and the Middle East would be 
complete without considering the importance of energy security. Since the end of the Second 
World War, US interest in Iraq and the Middle East in general was motivated by its desire to 
                                                
18 Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA359953&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf?type=Finjan-
Download&slot=00000039&id=00000038&location=80F3FD65  (21 May 2010). Larson et. al. Defense Planning in 
a Decade of Change: 41-81. 
19 Anthony Lake, ‘Confronting Backlash States’ Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994: 45. 
20 Lake ‘Confronting Backlash States’: 47-52 
21 Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: 127 
22 General Wesley K. Clark, Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire (Public Affairs, 
New York 2003): 6 
preserve access to the region’s petroleum resources and to ensure a reliable supply of 
(relatively) cheap oil. (During the Cold War, the corollary to this was minimizing Soviet 
influence in the region).23 Iraq’s possession of the second largest reserves of oil in the world 
made it a key producer; guaranteeing access to cheap oil would yield many benefits for the 
United States.24 It would facilitate national economic, political and military power, as well as 
power over others, including allies, who were not in a position to guarantee the supply of their 
own oil. In short, maintaining a position as the dominant outside power in the Middle East was 
an essential component of global superpower status. Over the decades, US policy towards Iraq 
had been determined by the imperatives of energy security and preventing these vital resources 
from falling into hostile hands. After the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, Saddam Hussein 
became a trusted American ally and received military, financial and intelligence aid from 
Washington after his invasion of Iran. But when Saddam subsequently invaded Kuwait, 
another oil-rich country, the United States took the lead in repelling the attack because to 
acquiesce would have left the dictator in control of two oil rich countries in the region. Saddam 
would become the dominant power in the Mid East, a position the United States wanted to 
maintain for itself.25 This, then, was the context in which US policy makers and intelligence 
analysts viewed Iraq in the early nineties: as the leading ‘rogue state’ with a credible military 
capability—including an active nuclear programme—and an appetite for expansionism in a 
region that the US itself had sought for decades to dominate.  
                                                
23 For a comprehensive overview of US energy and security policy to the Middle East, see Daniel Yergin, The Prize: 
The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (Simon & Schuster, New York 2009): 371-774. 
24 For statistics on global energy reserves, see Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global 
Conflict (Owl Books, New York 2001): 45. 
25 Steven Hurst The United States and Iraq Since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War (Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh 2009): 83. 
The tentative pursuit of the ousting of Saddam (though not the Baathist regime) began in early 
1992. Saddam had clung to power during the war but the Bush administration realised that he 
would no longer support US objectives in the region. To encourage a pro-American coup—
although not the collapse of the entire regime—Bush signed a covert finding authorizing the 
CIA to hire the Rendon Group, a Washington DC firm specializing in “perception 
management” services, on a one hundred million dollar contract in 1992 to “create the 
conditions for removal of Saddam Hussein from power” in the expectation that the Iraqi 
dictator would be deposed before long from within, preferably through a pro-Western military 
coup.26 This was not to be, but the covert efforts to unseat Saddam continued after Clinton took 
office. In August 1993, Ahmed Chalabi, the leader of a new Iraqi opposition group called the 
Iraqi National Congress (INC) that had been created by the Rendon Group the previous year, 
received a letter from Vice President Al Gore implying support for a policy ultimately directed 
towards regime change. “I assure you that we will not turn our backs on the Kurds or the other 
Iraqi communities subjected to the repression of Saddam Hussein’s regime” Gore wrote. He 
stressed the administration’s support for humanitarian relief efforts but also suggested that it 
might be prepared to go beyond this: 
Secretary Christopher, National Security Advisor Lake, and I made a solid 
commitment to INC representatives in our meetings, and we pledged our support 
for a democratic alternative to the Saddam Hussein regime. I can assure you that 
the U.S. intends to live up to these commitments and to give whatever additional 
                                                
26 James Bamford, ‘The Man Who Sold the War’ Rolling Stone, 17 November 2005, 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/8798997/the_man_who_sold_the_war/ (17 August 2009). Andrew 
Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession (Verso, London, 2002): 12-3, 31-57. 
Jane Mayer, ‘The Manipulator’ The New Yorker, 7 June 2004, 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/06/07/040607fa_fact1  (21 December 2009) Hiro, Iraq: 71-94. Christian 
Alfonsi, Circle in the Sand: Why We Went Back to Iraq (Doubleday, New York 2006): 193-4, 234-7 
support we can reasonably provide to encourage you in your struggle for a 
democratic Iraq.27 
In November 1993, four months after he sent the letter, Chalabi presented the administration 
with a four stage war plan titled ‘The End Game’ and in response Clinton authorized a covert 
CIA operation based in Iraqi Kurdistan to work with Iraqi exiles in the INC and the Iraqi 
National Accord (INA—also established by the Rendon Group) to organize a coup against 
Saddam.28 Thus while Clinton’s official policy towards Iraq was containment, the 
administration also quietly supported opposition-led efforts to oust Saddam. The CIA’s station 
in northern Iraq sponsored two coups by the Iraqi opposition in 1995 and 1996. Chalabi’s 
group organized an insurrection in the north to begin in March 1995, but the CIA withdrew 
support at the last minute after a rival in the INA convinced Washington that the plan would 
provoke a massive military backlash from Baghdad and the covert operation would become an 
overt bloodbath involving the United States. When the rebellion went ahead anyway it failed 
spectacularly. An anti-Saddam coup was subsequently planned by the INA for June 1996 but 
that plot failed after being infiltrated by Iraqi intelligence—a point we shall return to later.29  
Even in the early nineties both Republicans and Democrats saw the advantages of ousting 
Saddam—although not at this stage his whole regime. Once a key ally, Saddam’s pursuit of 
regional hegemony had made him a liability. What concerns us here is whether the efforts to 
                                                
27 The letter was re-printed in the Congressional record when Chalabi presented it to the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations after testifying in March 1998. See ‘Iraq: Can Saddam Be Overthrown?’ Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 
Senate, One Hundred Fifth Congress, March 2, 1998, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_senate_hearings&docid=f:47150.pdf (22 February 2009): 15 
28 Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command (Penguin Books, London, 2005): 164. Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True 
Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism (Arrow Books, London, 2002): 255-63, 299-319. 
29 For a full account, see Hiro, Iraq: 71-136; Ritter, Endgame: 131-46. 
remove him were politically-driven or intelligence-led or a combination of both. Did these 
efforts continue because intelligence suggested that Saddam retained WMD or did the policy 
transcend the work of the UN weapons inspectors? 
The Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO) and Saddam’s Nuclear Programme                                
The CIA had failed to see the full scope of Saddam’s nuclear programme during the 1980s.30 It 
was only with the bombing of Tarmiya, twenty-five miles north of Baghdad, in the 1991 war 
that the nuclear programme came to light. With assistance from US intelligence, the INVO 
inspectors began to examine the site in May 1991. What became apparent quickly was that Iraq 
had not just one uranium enrichment experiment but three. The entire programme had been 
undetected because Iraqi scientists had replicated the Manhattan Project and used an old-
fashioned process known as electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS). This was a relatively 
slow and labour-intensive process that had been abandoned by other nuclear powers so US 
intelligence never considered that Saddam might use it.31 Moreover, after the invasion of 
Kuwait, Iraq had also planned a ‘crash’ nuclear programme in which highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) would be diverted from IAEA safeguards and used for a weapon—although the 
beginning of the UN inspections prevented this from ever taking place.32 
Why the CIA failed to recognise that Saddam had a nuclear programme is beyond the scope of 
this chapter.33 Suffice it here to say that, despite this, the INVO nuclear disarmament 
                                                
30 Diamond, CIA and the Culture of Failure: 179-184. 
31 James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (Free Press, New York, 
2006): 96-7 
32  Fourth consolidated report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 
16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996) (henceforth IAEA 1997), Part Two, 
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Invo/reports/s_1997_779.pdf : 48 (22 May 2010) 
33 For some discussion on this see Diamond, CIA and the Culture of Failure: 184-6 
programme was hugely successful. Blix described the early results as “spectacular” and with 
good reason.34 What the inspectors found initially was “a very well-funded programme aimed 
at indigenous development and exploitation of technologies for the production of weapon-
usable material and the development and production of nuclear weapons, with a target date of 
1991 for the first weapon.”35 By 1992, they had essentially dismantled this programme, 
although the removal of weapon-usable material continued until 1994. The IAEA reported “a 
comprehensive campaign of destruction, removal and rendering harmless of the practical assets 
of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme.”36 This included accounting for the entire inventory 
of HEU that had been destined for the ‘crash’ programme.37 Saddam had decided that his 
nuclear ambitions were secondary to the prime objective of ending sanctions and ensuring the 
survival of the regime.38 All that was left was “the intent to retain the intellectual capital” 
necessary to one day revive the nuclear programme when sanctions were lifted.39 As a result of 
INVO’s success, it reached a “point of diminishing returns” through inspections and in 1994 it 
implemented its Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) plan with the establishment of 
the Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG), which would have a continuous presence in Iraq.40  
When the UNSCOM chemical and biological inspections became particularly fractious in 
October 1997, Iraq continued to work with the IAEA nuclear monitors. When Baghdad 
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declared that it would no longer deal with U.S. nationals in the UNSCOM team, it also 
announced that “[a]ll IAEA staff, inspectors and experts will be welcome as usual.” The same 
was true of the subsequent crisis a year later.41 
However, the inspection and verification process for all WMD came to an end in late 1998 
when the Clinton administration decided to bomb Iraq in December after a series of stand-offs 
during which UNSCOM inspectors had been denied access to certain sensitive sites. This led to 
disarray at the UN Security Council. There were differences of opinion amongst its members 
as to the future of the sanctions regime, which was eroding, and the future of the chemical and 
biological weapons inspections, particularly of certain sensitive sites such as Presidential 
residences.42 However, the destruction of Iraq’s nuclear programme was still widely accepted 
by UN staff and inspectors. In 1999, the United Nations set up a panel led by Brazilian 
Ambassador to the UN, Celso Amorim, to examine the findings to date of the weapons 
inspectors, with a view to re-establishing an UNSCOM and IAEA presence in Iraq. All twenty 
members of the panel were former inspectors (eleven from UNSCOM and three from the 
IAEA).43 They reported that the IAEA had “been able, in the course of eight years of extensive 
inspection activities, to develop a technically coherent picture of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear 
programme.” By the end of 1992, the IAEA had destroyed the components of the programme 
and by February 1994, it had removed all weapon-usable material from Iraq. Moreover: 
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On the basis of its findings, the Agency is able to state that there is no indication 
that Iraq possesses nuclear weapons or any meaningful amounts of weapon-usable 
nuclear material or that Iraq has retained any capability (facilities or hardware) for 
the production of such material.44 
Individual inspectors—with quite different views on how to deal with Saddam Hussein—spoke 
on the record about how the country had essentially been disarmed of all its WMD, not just 
nuclear material. Rolf Ekeus was the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM from 1991-97. In 2003 
he supported the US-led invasion of Iraq on the grounds that Iraq retained researchers and 
engineers who had worked on WMD programmes—in other words it aspired to develop 
WMD—but it had not retained the weapons themselves. Ekeus acknowledged in 2000 that the 
inspectors had been “highly successful....  In my view there are no large quantities of weapons. 
Rather Iraq has been aiming to keep the capability to start up production immediately should it 
need to.”45 Scott Ritter, an UNSCOM inspector for seven years, agreed. In 1999, Ritter 
published an account of the inspections process that dealt with Iraqi attempts to conceal WMD 
but also with the ultimate success of the inspections: what remained was “little more than the 
bare bones of the of massive [pre-1991] projects... Despite all of Iraq’s efforts to conceal, 
obfuscate and distort the truth, [we] managed to dispose of the vase majority [of WMD].”46 
Charles Duelfer, Deputy Executive Chair of UNSCOM from 1993-2000, gave strong support 
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to the 2003 invasion of Iraq but, like Ekeus, this was because he believed that Saddam retained 
the desire for WMD, not because he actually possessed the proscribed weapons. Duelfer’s 
2004 report on Iraq’s WMD—the final official US report to be written on the subject—
acknowledged that Saddam’s “ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively 
decayed after [1991].” This was because the primary goals of the regime were to lift sanctions 
and to secure itself.47  
This should not be entirely surprising because the inspections were intrusive and were backed 
up by the threat of force. Inspectors were allowed to conduct invasive no-notice inspections of 
any site inside Iraq.48 This was combined with the toughest sanctions regime in history, the 
objective of which was to prevent Iraq from importing any material or equipment that could be 
used for the production of WMD. This included a great deal of dual-use material, which meant 
that the Iraqi people were deprived of many of their basic material needs, including medicines 
and medical equipment. The sanctions devastated the Iraqi economy and society. The UN’s 
humanitarian co-ordinator for Iraq, Denis Halliday, resigned in protest over what he claimed 
were “genocidal sanctions” that were leading to the deaths of six thousand Iraqi infants per 
month.49 As a result the sanctions regime was much-maligned and the humanitarian impact led 
to discord and uncertainty on the Security Council. In terms of Iraq’s WMD, however, the 
sanctions broke the industrial backbone of the country and made WMD reconstitution 
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unrealistic.50 Even though the sanctions had begun to erode by the turn of the century it would 
take years, if not decades, for Saddam to re-build the necessary infrastructure. David Kay, a 
former UNSCOM inspector who strongly supported the 2003 invasion, told the Senate Armed 
Services Committee in January 2004 that he believed that the Iraqis had not simply moved 
large WMD stockpiles to a neighbouring country before the invasion because they did not have 
the capability to produce such stockpiles in the first place.51 
It was not just INVO that succeeded in disarming Saddam. UNSCOM also achieved much 
success in disarming Iraq of its CBW. To be sure, UNSCOM had to face greater denial and 
deception efforts on the part of Saddam.52 The actual weaponization of biological agents—as 
opposed to simply having a BW programme—was unknown until the 1995 defection of 
General Hussein Kamel, Saddam’s son-in-law who had been in charge of all WMD 
programmes.53 Nevertheless, Iraq had been disarmed of most of its known CBW and the main 
production facilities destroyed. According to the Amorim Report compiled by former 
inspectors, “the bulk of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes has [sic.] been eliminated.”54  
Yet, the US Intelligence Community was disinclined to accept this. The best intelligence 
coming out of Iraq—from those who had seen the WMD programmes, or what was left of 
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them, first hand—was not fully accepted by the US IC, which, in general, chose to emphasize 
what was not known about Iraq’s WMD rather than what was. From 1998 onwards, the CIA 
delivered a Congressionally mandated biannual Unclassified Report to Congress on the 
Acquisition of Technology Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced 
Conventional Munitions.55 These reports focused heavily on the rogue states, Iraq, Iran and 
North Korea. They contained no indication that, for the most part, Iraq had been denuclearised 
(and also stripped of most of its CBW). Tending towards a worst-case scenario, the reports 
focused on the small amount of material that was unaccounted for rather than the bigger picture 
of success. Despite the dismantling of the nuclear programme constituting the UN’s biggest 
success, in the first Unclassified Report of 1998, the CIA stated that: 
Iraq continues to hide documentation, and probably some equipment, relating to 
key aspects of past nuclear activities.  After years of Iraqi denials, the IAEA was 
able to get Iraq to admit to a far more advanced nuclear weapons program and a 
project based on advanced uranium enrichment technology.  However, Baghdad 
continues to withhold significant information about enrichment techniques, foreign 
procurement, and weapons design.56  
Although not all this information was historically inaccurate, it created the impression that the 
nuclear issue was unresolved by 1998. What was not stated was that the nuclear program had 
been discovered and dismantled by 1992, as documented in the INVO and the OMV reports. 
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At the end of 1998, the UN inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq at the behest of the Clinton 
administration, which planned to bomb suspected WMD sites in response to Iraq’s denial and 
deception efforts. After Operation Desert Fox, the inspectors would not return to Iraq for 
another five years. In a 2000 report to Congress, the CIA stated that “[h]aving lost this on-the-
ground access, it is more difficult for the UN or the US to accurately assess the current state of 
Iraq’s WMD programs.”  As a result the Agency tended to simply assume that Saddam was 
reconstituting WMD: a June 1999 report stated that although “we do not have any direct 
evidence that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute its WMD programs… 
given its past behaviour, this type of activity must be regarded as likely” (emphasis added). 
Regarding the nuclear programme, “we were already concerned about a reconstituted nuclear 
weapons program, [but] our concerns were increased last September when Saddam publicly 
exhorted his ‘Nuclear Mujahidin’ to ‘defeat the enemy’”; rhetoric that the CIA seems to have 
taken literally despite the weight of evidence against it from the IAEA.57  
Nor did the reports to Congress mention evidence provided in 1995 by General Hussein 
Kamel, the man responsible for all of the country’s weapons programmes (also Saddam’s son-
in-law), who defected to Jordan and was debriefed by the IAEA, UNSCOM and the CIA. 
Kamel told his debriefers of Saddam’s decision to abandon his weapons in the early nineties as 
a result of pressure from the inspections regime: “All weapons—biological, chemical, missile, 
nuclear were destroyed” he said, adding that the inspections were working well in Iraq: “You 
have [an] important role in Iraq. You should not underestimate yourself. You are very effective 
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in Iraq.”58 Since the Iraqis had no records of what they had destroyed in 1991 this could not be 
independently verified, but there were some grounds to trust Kamel: he led the UNSCOM 
inspectors to a large hidden cache of documents that the regime had tried to preserve and 
revealed that Iraq had in the past managed to weaponize biological agents (although the 
inspectors already knew about the existence of the BW programme). In the process Kamel had 
also put himself in danger; on returning to Iraq, he was shot dead by Saddam.59 His defection 
might therefore have prompted at least a degree of reassessment60—but in the end it had no 
discernable impact on the CIA’s analysis. None of the Agency’s unclassified reports to 
Congress during the Clinton years mentioned Kamel. According to Charles Duelfer, it was 
“manifestly clear to the intelligence community that the Clinton administration had a very 
strong incentive to find Iraq in violation of the UN sanctions” and this sometimes led them to 
use data that he describes as “pretty lame” or even “junk”.61 
The UNSCOM Saga 
To be sure, Saddam had not given the same level of co-operation to UNSCOM as he did to 
INVO. The problems faced by UNSCOM have dominated the debate over the inspections 
process and obscured the success of INVO. It is worth reviewing the UNSCOM saga here 
because the obstructionism regarding CBW does not seem to correspond with—and perhaps 
even casts doubt on—Iraq’s co-operation on nuclear matters. But the UNSCOM process was 
                                                
58 Kamel debriefing transcript. Diamond calls Kamel’s defection the single most important piece of intelligence on 
Iraq in this period. CIA and the Culture of Failure: 396 
59 Duelfer offers the following comment on whether Kamel could be trusted: “We knew he aspired to return to Iraq 
as its new leader. It would not be unreasonable for him to wish to have WMD when he got back” but argues that 
“hard evidence” was needed from the regime in Baghdad not from one of its defectors. Hide and Seek: 115 
60 Jervis also makes this point in Why Intelligence Fails: 137 
61 Ibid: 88-9. 
far more politicized than INVO. The UNSCOM story demonstrates what happens when a 
supra-national disarmament process becomes highly politicised and even manipulated by 
national governments in a way that did not occur with INVO. This political intrusion also 
offers a partial explanation for Iraq’s lack of co-operation in some cases and its continued 
willingness to co-operate with INVO. 
In 1991, Iraq unilaterally destroyed much of its WMD and made this known to the inspection 
teams. However, it had not done this under international supervision, as required by UN 
resolutions. The lack of documentation left UNSCOM with no way to verify the destruction 
other than literally digging up and piecing together fragments of destroyed weapons; a problem 
that plagued the CBW inspections process.62 Saddam had also instituted a programme of denial 
and deception in April 1991 to be carried out by the Concealment Operations Committee in an 
effort to secretly retain small amounts of material and a library of documents containing the 
scientific know-how.63 The lack of documentation and the concealment efforts meant there 
were holes in Iraq’s declarations of its WMD and the UN was forced to ask repeatedly for 
‘Full, Final and Complete’ declarations, which were rarely any of those. Some inspections of 
suspected CBW sites were subsequently blocked. Iraqi conduct therefore encouraged 
suspicions that it retained WMD.64  
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Unbeknownst to UNSCOM at the time, however, the Concealment Committee also quickly 
ordered the unilateral destruction of what secretly remained of Iraq’s WMD in 1991 (as later 
reported by Hussein Kamel). The regime had thought that the inspections would be over in a 
matter of weeks, but it quickly became clear that they would be longer lasting and more 
intrusive than this. Saddam’s priorities were the survival of his regime and the removal of 
sanctions. As a result he took what the CIA retrospectively described, years later, as his 
“fateful decision”: in 1991 the Concealment Committee was ordered to unilaterally destroy the 
small stockpiles that had not been declared to the UN and to retain only a secret library of 
information that might be of use in the future. In doing so, however, the regime also destroyed 
documentation that could have verified the destruction of the remaining weapons later on, thus 
creating the perception that small amounts of WMD might remain.65  
Why, then, did Saddam fail to give full co-operation to the UNSCOM inspectors when there 
were so few, if any, CBW left to hide? Blix and Duelfer—who both had opposing views on 
regime change—believe there were other possible explanations for Saddam’s recalcitrance. 
Among the most important was that Iraq wanted others in the region, especially Iran, to believe 
it had WMD. As the Duelfer Report concluded in 2004: “Iran was the prime motivator of this 
policy.” The two countries had been at war from 1980-88 and all senior level Iraqi officials still 
considered Iran to be their principal enemy. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and 
influence in the Arab world were also contributing factors. Tariq Aziz openly expressed 
hostility to both Israel and “the Persians” to Richard Butler in early 1998.66 This was a political 
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calculation by Iraq, the deduction of which did not necessarily require secret intelligence; yet it 
was never even considered in the CIA’s reports to Congress. 
A second issue was the sanctions. In 1991, when they were imposed, Iraq was told that the 
sanctions would be removed if and when it co-operated with the UN inspectors according to 
UN Resolution 687. Despite the efforts to conceal documents and information, the majority of 
the inspections did pass off without incident and Iraq was particularly co-operative with INVO. 
Yet not only was there no sign of the sanctions being lifted or eased, the Clinton administration 
was covertly working towards the demise of Saddam.  If there was no chance of sanctions 
disappearing and if the ultimate US objective was regime change, there was little incentive for 
Iraq to co-operate fully.67 Tariq Aziz told Duelfer at the time that he did not believe that 
Washington would accept a report from UNSCOM that might lead to the lifting of sanctions: 
“Therefore we have a simple choice: Iraq could have sanctions with inspectors or sanctions 
without inspections” he said.68 Duelfer also reports that in August 1998 Aziz made a proposal 
to Richard Butler, the new head of UNSCOM, that Iraq would permit inspectors of all types to 
have complete access anywhere in Iraq for six months. At the end of the six months, however, 
UNSCOM would have to declare Iraq in full compliance unless it found weapons material. 
“Aziz’s point was that Iraq wanted closure, not an endless process” Duelfer writes. “He wanted 
UNSCOM to report to the Security Council so the council would have to confront the issue of 
removing sanctions. We did not give the idea serious consideration at the time because we 
thought it was simply a tactic to divide the Security Council.”69 
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The humiliating nature of some of the inspections may also have affected Iraq’s behaviour. The 
way that inspections were carried out became a bone of contention between Blix and David 
Kay. “Inspectors should always avoid humiliating the inspected” says Blix. Attacking Kay, 
Blix argues that  
[A] Rambo-style attitude on the part of the inspectors antagonizes more than it 
intimidates. Inspection is not the pursuit of war by other means. Inspectors are not 
occupiers and should neither shoot nor shout their way in... To the Iraqi side, David 
Kay became like a red cape to a bull...70 
This sense of humiliation might have been exacerbated by the particularly intrusive nature of 
the inspections, especially to sites associated with the sovereignty of Iraq.71 This was especially 
the case after 1997 when UNSCOM began to attempt to inspect some of Saddam’s personal 
residences. The inspections of the so-called Presidential sites twice led Iraq to balk at the 
demands that were being made of it, requiring the intervention of UN Secretary General, Kofi 
Annan.72 
Moreover, the UNSCOM inspections process was allegedly being subverted by the Clinton 
administration to aid its covert pursuit of regime change. Scott Ritter describes the CIA 
presence in the UNSCOM team until 1996 as “the ghost in the machine.”73 His account of the 
inspections describes how CIA Special Activity staff, specialising in paramilitary operations, 
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were made available to UNSCOM as inspectors. In June 1996, a team which included nine 
CIA agents attempted to inspect a Special Republican Guard (SRG) facility but were prevented 
from doing so by the Iraqis, who had discovered a coup plot against Saddam, which they 
believed was to be carried out at the time of the inspection by SRG members from the units 
UNSCOM was trying to inspect. Ritter’s allegation was that the inspectors from the CIA—who 
vanished inexplicably after the contested SRG inspections—were complicit in the coup. 
Although UNSCOM’s chief inspectors may not have been aware of this at the time, the 
response of Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, to Ekeus on June 19th made it clear that 
the Iraqis certainly believed this was the case.74 This would be consistent with the Clinton 
administration’s covert pursuit of regime change and would also explain Iraq’s willingness to 
continue co-operating with the IAEA’s nuclear monitoring. After June 1996, Iraq directed its 
resistance specifically towards UNSCOM inspectors from the United States (as opposed to 
those of other nationalities) and requested that the CBW inspection teams be reconstituted to 
reflect a wider range of nationalities. It was, however, still prepared to admit US nationals as 
part of the IAEA teams.75 There is no evidence at present, however, that the US IC ever 
considered these events from Baghdad’s perspective. Resisting inspections out of a belief that 
the US was using them to aid its covert pursuit of regime change would certainly explain Iraq’s 
behaviour in this case; but Saddam’s failure to allow the inspection was viewed purely as 
another example of his determination to conceal his CBW arsenal.  
                                                
74 Ibid: 131-44. For Tariq Aziz’s response, which is cited at length see pp. 139-41.  
75 Blix, Disarming Iraq: 31, 34. Butler writes that although Iraq was prepared to admit a US national who worked 
for the IAEA in November 1997—when it was refusing entry to US nationals in UNSCOM—there was an 
agreement between UNSCOM and the IAEA that they should only enter Iraq together and so the US national 
returned to Bahrain. Greatest Threat: 95 and 91-2. 
By this stage, the neutrality of UNSCOM was also being compromised by illicit intelligence 
sharing with national intelligence services from the United States and elsewhere. Charles 
Duelfer later described UNSCOM as “a spy magnet” that included informers from many 
countries “for a variety of reasons beyond merely supporting UNSCOM.”76 Blix concurs that 
“activities had taken place under the label but not under the control of UNSCOM.”77 Stories 
appeared in the press about how, unbeknownst to UNSCOM, the CIA had “piggybacked” on 
the work of the inspectors to covertly eavesdrop on the Iraqi military for three years.78 
Established as a neutral and independent UN taskforce, its mandate was being violated by 
national governments engaging in espionage inside Iraq; a situation unlikely to please 
Baghdad.  Yet despite the compromised position in which UNSCOM found itself, the CIA 
continued to attribute all friction between Iraq and the inspectors to Saddam’s determination to 
maintain a WMD capacity.79  
The default position of US intelligence and policy makers was that Saddam’s denial and 
deception efforts meant that anything could be going on behind closed doors. Explaining his 
decision to use force against Iraq in Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Clinton told the 
American public that “Saddam’s deception has defeated [the inspectors’] effectiveness. Instead 
of the inspectors disarming Saddam, Saddam has disarmed the inspectors.”80 In fact, the 
opposite was true. By 1995, after three years of very careful observation—and with help from 
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US and Israeli intelligence—the inspectors had finally unravelled Iraq’s concealment 
mechanism and were attempting to counter it.81 Ritter and his colleague, Nikita Smidovich of 
Russia, had determined that Iraq had a network of hiding places, a fleet of trucks with which to 
transport the libraries of information it was still trying to preserve and that it relied on early 
warnings of where the inspectors planned to go. From 1996 onwards, Ritter and Smidovich 
began planning some inspections on the basis of this information in order to thwart Iraqi 
obfuscation.82 This, therefore, gave the conclusions of UNSCOM—that Iraq was largely 
disarmed—even greater force because their results had been achieved in spite of Iraq’s 
concealment efforts.  
Thus the common narrative of intransigent Iraqi obstructionism is not entirely accurate and the 
disconnect between the fractious UNSCOM inspections and the successful IAEA monitoring, 
though real, is less pronounced than is often assumed. The politicization of UNSCOM offers at 
least a partial explanation as to why some of its inspections were blocked and why the Iraqis 
continued to co-operate with the nuclear OMV. Yet US intelligence reports relied on an 
unchanging, default view of Saddam as a determined regional aggressor. There seemed to be 
no distinction made between the work of UNSCOM and that of the IAEA. The 
denuclearisation of Iraq was a huge success yet Clinton invoked Iraq’s nuclear programme 
three times in his address to the nation before Desert Fox, as well as Iraq’s alleged “military 
capacity to threaten its neighbours”—an unlikely prospect given the success of the inspections 
and the demise of Iraq’s industrial base.83 To the Clinton administration, Iraq appears to have 
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remained the chief ‘rogue state.’ It had been designated as such before Clinton even came to 
power and this was reinforced by the fact that US military posture was designed to fight two 
Desert Storm-sized conflicts simultaneously. This appears to have led to a mindset in which the 
assumption of Iraqi aggression and its maintenance of WMD was never questioned by the 
President and his advisors, by the IC or by Congress. Since 1992, the United States and Britain 
had been policing the ‘no-fly zones’—illegal under international law—through regular 
bombings and by 1999 this had become a low-level air war.84 In 1998, Congress passed the 
Iraq Liberation Act, making it official US policy to work towards regime change in Iraq. So 
uncontroversial was the measure that it was passed under suspension of the rules in the House 
and Unanimous Consent in the Senate, meaning that both parties agreed to its passage without 
any debate at all.85  In Iraq, however, this was viewed as further proof that the United States 
was no longer serious about the UN disarmament process or the lifting of sanctions.86 
The Bush Administration and Regime Change                                                                          
It was not just Clinton and his advisors that saw the benefits of regime change in Iraq. From the 
very beginning of George W. Bush’s time in office, policy towards Iraq preceded intelligence. 
Even before 9/11, Bush and his advisors stated their preference for regime change. Donald 
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz and other Bush advisors had 
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openly stated their support for regime change in Iraq during the Clinton years.87 Although Iraq 
was not a particular issue in the 2000 Presidential campaign, the aspirations of the Republican 
Party were stated unequivocally in its Platform: 
A new Republican administration will patiently rebuild an international coalition 
opposed to Saddam Hussein and committed to joint action…. We support the full 
implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act, which should be regarded as a starting 
point in a comprehensive plan for the removal of Saddam Hussein and the restoration 
of international inspections in collaboration with his successor. Republicans 
recognize that peace and stability in the Persian Gulf is impossible as long as Saddam 
Hussein rules Iraq.88  
Having a long-term objective should not be confused with having the opportunity to pursue it, 
but Bush’s pre-9/11 policy deliberations confirm what the ultimate aim was towards Iraq. At 
the first meeting of the National Security Council on 30 January 2001, Iraq was the first item 
on the agenda. Rumsfeld, who had publically declared his support for regime change in 1998, 
hypothesized: “Imagine what the region would look like without Saddam and with a regime 
that is aligned with U.S. interests. It would change everything in the region and beyond. It 
would demonstrate what U.S. policy is all about.”89 On February 6, Bush announced that the 
U.S. would resume funding opposition efforts inside Iraq for the first time since the Iraqi army 
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overran the rebels’ main base in 1996.90 Plans were also made for some rebels to receive 
limited military training in Texas in March. “This is important because this is the first time we 
are receiving lethal training with the United States government funding,” said Francis Brooke, 
a Washington representative of Iraqi National Congress that had been behind the failed coup of 
1995.91  Ten days later, the administration undertook the most extensive bombing of Iraqi 
positions since December 1998.92 
There was no clear-cut consensus on how to deal with Iraq at this stage, however. An 
interagency group on Iraq was established by the administration and led by Richard Hass, 
director of Policy Planning at the State Department, which suggested supporting the INC’s 
plan for US support for an uprising by Iraqi rebels and exiles. This was considered from late 
April to the end of July in deputies’ meetings of high-ranking CIA officials, Deputy Secretary 
of State Richard Armitage, Wolfowitz and Vice-President Dick Cheney’s national security 
adviser, Lewis Libby, and in the Principals Committee of Condoleezza Rice, the National 
Security Advisor, Cheney, Powell, now Secretary of State, and George Tenet, the CIA chief.93 
Wolfowitz, pressing the activist agenda, proposed the bombing of dams to recreate the 
marshlands in Iraq and, with his assistant, Zalmay Khalilzad, drafted further proposals for the 
arming and training of insurgents; the strategy they had supported since the late nineties.94 
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Rumsfeld, however, was skeptical of the utility of further covert action in Iraq and called 
instead for the bolstering of the no-fly zones. Thus while “A Liberation Strategy” was 
completed on 1 August, no specific recommendations were put to the President.95 What it did 
indicate, though, was that regime change in Iraq was under discussion before 9/11, albeit not as 
the administration’s top priority. As in the Clinton years, policy would not be driven by the 
reality of a denuclearized Iraq, which had been stripped of most of its other WMD too. It 
would be driven by Rumsfeld’s call to “demonstrate what U.S. policy is all about” in the 
Middle East.  
It was no surprise, then, that just five hours after the attacks on New York, Washington and 
Pennsylvania, Rumsfeld called for “Best info fast. Judge whether good enough to hit S[addam] 
H[ussein] at same time. Not only O[sama] B[in] L[aden]… Go massive. Sweep it all up. 
Things related and not”.96 Within days, the Pentagon had established the Policy Counter-
Terrorism Evaluation Group to cherry-pick intelligence that might link Iraq with al Qaeda, the 
group responsible for the 9/11 attacks. This was later expanded into the larger Office of Special 
Plans.97 The second pillar of the case for war was that Saddam Hussein possessed large 
stockpiles of WMD and had an active nuclear program with which he could support terrorists. 
(The distinction should be made between actual possession of such weapons, which constituted 
the Bush administration’s rationale for war, and the aspiration to develop them if and when 
conditions permitted, which was Iraq’s position.) 
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In spite of the success of INVO, George Tenet, the Director of the Central Intelligence (DCI) 
told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2002— just a week after Bush’s 
“axis of evil” speech—that: 
We believe that Saddam never abandoned his nuclear weapons program. Iraq 
maintains a significant number of nuclear scientists, program documentation, and 
probably some dual-use manufacturing infrastructure that could support a 
reinvigorated nuclear weapons program. Baghdad’s access to foreign expertise 
could support a rejuvenated program. But our major near-term concern is the 
possibility that Saddam might gain access to fissile material. (Emphasis added)98 
Elements of this were not completely untrue but it constituted a worst-case scenario at the 
expense of the bigger picture of INVO’s success. (The same was true of claims made about 
Iraq’s CBW programmes99). 
When the Bush administration made its determination to pursue regime change clear, the 
Intelligence Community generally fell into line and supplied information—often spurious, 
hypothetical or even completely false—that could support the push for war on the basis of 
Saddam’s possession of WMD. According to Charles Duelfer, who saw much of this 
intelligence, the CIA was “piling wobbly assessments on top of wobbly assessments based on 
extrapolations from a few possible ‘facts’ at the bottom…”100 This information, in turn, was 
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often also exaggerated by senior policymakers. The IC’s worst-case scenarios on Iraq provided 
the basis for many of the now-discredited claims made by policymakers about Iraq’s nuclear 
programme and its other WMD.101 Since the nuclear disarmament had been the most 
successful aspect of the UN’s work, it was not surprising that some of the most questionable 
and speculative claims made by the administration concerned the nuclear question.  
In September 2002, Cheney stated that “[w]e do know, with absolute certainty, that [Saddam] 
is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium 
to build a nuclear weapon.”102  Cheney was referring to Iraq’s purchases of aluminum tubes; a 
claim that became a central plank of the case for a reconstituted nuclear programme. In 2004, 
the Duelfer Report concluded that the tubes were most likely destined to produce conventional 
rockets and that there was no uranium programme.103 In mid-2002, however, the CIA told 
Congress that they were part of a nuclear weapons programme. The October 2002 National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s WMD—which furnished the official case for war—stated 
that  
Most agencies believe that Saddam’s personal interest in and Iraq’s aggressive 
attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors… provide 
compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for 
Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program. ([The] D[epartment] O[f] E[nergy] agree[s] 
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that reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway but assesses that the tubes 
are probably not part of the program.) 104  
From here, the claim made it into Powell’s high stakes presentation of US intelligence to the 
UN Security Council in February 2003.105 In fact the analysts at the DoE did not agree that the 
tubes were part of a nuclear weapons programme. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
(INR) at the State Department also disagreed and did not even think that Iraq had a nuclear 
program.106 However, the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) produced three 
papers on the aluminum tubes between August and September 2002, which claimed that there 
was little doubt that they were for anything other than a nuclear programme.107 Between July 
2001 and July 2002, the CIA produced nine other assessments of the tubes which all came to 
the same conclusion and which were distributed only to senior level policy makers.108  
In October 2002, the administration also began to publicize bogus claims that Iraq had tried to 
procure natural uranium (yellowcake) from Niger to support its nuclear programme. Rumours 
of the transaction had circulated for some time in the IC but in early October 2002 the US 
embassy in Rome received documents that allegedly proved the deal. When the State 
Department received the reports it passed them on to INR, which immediately suspected that 
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the documents were fake. When they were passed to the IAEA on 4th February 2003, they were 
instantly recognised as forgeries—a judgement the CIA was itself then forced to acknowledge. 
However, on 16th October 2002, INR passed copies to a colleague at the CIA, who simply filed 
the documents away in a vault without any further distribution.109 That same month, the CIA’s 
Office of Near East and South Asian Analysis (NESA) included the claim in classified 
handbook of reference material for senior policy makers and it also appeared in the October 
2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMD.110 At the CIA’s request, the claim was 
then removed from the President’s Cincinnati speech on 7th October 2002 but it resurfaced on 
17th January 2003 when the CIA published a paper on the alleged nuclear programme for the 
Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff, which stated that “reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium 
from various countries in Africa in the past several years is another sign of reconstitution (of 
the nuclear programme). Iraq has no legitimate use for uranium.”111 Finally, the claim was 
inserted into the President’s 2003 State of the Union address, which was given to Tenet in 
advance but which he neglected to read.112  
Finally, the CIA also attempted to bolster its claims about nuclear weapons by contacting Iraqi 
scientists using relatives living in the United States as intermediaries. Thirty scientists were 
contacted via their relations who had been briefed by the CIA and given specific questions to 
ask in order to fill in gaps in the CIA’s knowledge. In total, thirty scientists gave the same 
message to the CIA: that Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear programmes had long since 
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been abandoned. The agency ignored this and refused to disseminate the reports from family 
members to senior policy makers, instead suggesting that the scientists had all been lying.113  
By this stage the findings of INVO and the ongoing monitoring were completely irrelevant. A 
political decision had been taken to pursue regime change in Iraq and the intelligence and facts 
were fixed around the policy. Duelfer writes: 
I would later spend much time reining in analysts who came to Baghdad trying to 
investigate their prewar assessments. It took continuous attention to focus the effort 
on developing the story from the evidence in Iraq, not prewar assumptions in 
Washington.114 
Conclusions                                                                                                                               
There is much to be learned in terms of intelligence and non-proliferation from the Iraq 
episode. On the one hand, Iraq provides a model for how to disarm a recalcitrant state. The 
Iraqi nuclear programme was nullified. From 1994, the only job left was ongoing monitoring 
and verification. This was in part down to assistance from US intelligence, which provided 
satellite images of nuclear sites discovered during the 1991 war. The CIA also gave assistance 
in unravelling Saddam’s concealment programme.115 In sum, the inspectors did an outstanding 
job of disarming Iraq and received occasional but important help from US intelligence, which 
could assist from afar. 
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For the most part, however, this success occurred in spite of US government intervention rather 
than because of it. The entire process was compromised from start to finish because US policy 
towards Iraq, from the 1991 war to the 2003 invasion, was hyper-politicised. Ultimately, the 
US goal was not simply disarmament but regime change and since the US was the dominant 
political force behind the punitive measures imposed on Iraq, the whole disarmament process 
became hyper-politicised too and, at times, used as a vehicle for US objectives rather than UN 
goals. 
There were several strands to this hyper-politicisation. The assessments made by both 
intelligence analysts and policy makers in the United States seemed barely to change in 
response to events on the ground. Once Iraq had been designated an official US adversary in 
the early nineties, there was no deviation from the “rogue state” narrative from either analysts 
or policy makers. This seemed to be reinforced by the fact that the new post-Soviet defence 
posture would be based on fighting two such rogue states simultaneously with Iraq serving as 
the model for this. Currently available intelligence assessments suggest that at no stage did 
intelligence analysts—or, for that matter, policy makers—consider how US covert action in 
Iraq might affect Iraqi behaviour and attitudes towards the inspections. Any clues that might 
have prompted a reassessment were ignored or summarily dismissed in favour of a default 
view in which Saddam’s actions were always driven solely by his determination to conceal 
stockpiles of WMD. This led to an unquestioned assumption that WMD had to exist. As 
Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) put it during Kay’s 2004 testimony to the Senate: “We just felt it 
was so impossible that they didn’t exist.”116 By 1998, there was a bipartisan consensus in the 
US Congress that regime change should be the official US objective in Iraq because the United 
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States could not tolerate a rogue leader like Saddam in a region that was so strategically vital, 
in which the United States itself sought to remain the dominant outside power.  
Finally, in the short term, the use of CIA agents on the ground as inspectors, in contrast to the 
more useful contributions that US intelligence might be able to make from afar, contributed to 
the hyper-politicisation. In Iraqi eyes at least, this seems to have turned the process into an 
American pursuit of Saddam rather than an international disarmament programme.    
When the Bush administration came to power it, too, was committed to enforcing the Iraq 
Liberation Act. It was not committed to an international disarmament programme because its 
ultimate objective was to pursue regime change. This resulted in intelligence that was heavily 
skewed by political imperatives. Ultimately, it is not in the CIA’s remit to unilaterally enforce 
non-proliferation norms because that decision is a political one. In the case of Iraq, the US 
objective was not just disarmament but, in the long term, establishing a stable pro-American 
regime in Baghdad. As US tolerance of the Israeli and Indian nuclear deterrents demonstrates, 
it is the political standpoint of the regime that is most important to US policy makers. Thus, 
while improvements in intelligence collection and analysis are always salutary, the lesson from 
Iraq is that they will not result in better, more effective non-proliferation initiatives unless 
those initiatives happen to coincide with US interests as defined by policy makers. 
 
